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Tertium datur
Lukács’ Early Aesthetics and Ethics  
as Mirrored in Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen
1. »Bei mir ist jede Sache die Fortsetzung von 
etwas«
Several prominent concepts from Lukács’ late Die 
Eigenart des Ästhetischen (1963) can already, at 
least embrionically, be forefelt in his early studies 
Soul and Form (1910/1911) and The Theory of the 
Novel (1915/1920). This proposition, propped 
up by Judith Butler’s recent remark that »it is 
clear that many of the same problems about lan-
guage, form, social totality, and transformative 
communication continue throughout his life«,1 
takes its lead from an assertion put forward by 
Michael Löwy decades ago (1976), namely that 
»the ideology of a given writer can be under-
stood only in relation to his thought as a whole« 
and that »his thought must in turn be inserted 
into the world view that provides its structure of 
meaning«.2 These observations, the validity of 
which is in Lukács’ case as obvious as it is com-
monly ignored, resound with the crucial ques-
tion whether Lukács’ »earlier works proved to be 
1 Butler: Introduction, p. 2.
2 Löwy: Georg Lukács, p. 11.
Considering common 
compartmentalizations 
of Lukacs’ work into the 
early, mature, and late 
phase, the article explores 
elements that speak to 
what critics regard as a 
›continuity thesis‹. Against 
possible assumptions on 
the prevalence of form 
in his early work and the 
dominance of the aesthetics 
of content in the later 
phases, the article explores 
the dialectical relationship 
of form and content, which 
comes to represent a 
leitmotif in Lukacs’ work 
as a whole. Here, the early 
specificity of form does not 
consist of its domination 
over content but in the 
inability of the aesthetic to 
tackle the social problems of 
a modernity in which art and 
life part ways.
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fully comprehensible only in the light of the later ones«.3 Before continuing 
in the footsteps of these suggestive remarks, let me point to one which is 
ingrained as a severe misapprehension of the individual stages of Lukács’ 
intellectual and political development; a misapprehension that comes to 
underpin even Butler’s otherwise accurate and updated Introduction. In her 
foreword, Butler correctly suggests that »the early emphasis on form might 
be said to refute the stark opposition between subjective and objective modes 
of experience upon which [Lukács’] later criticism relies«.4 Granted that 
Butler does make the pertinent remark that Lukács’ »later« studies present 
»a change of emphasis« rather than a »self-repudiation«,5 she nevertheless 
references to Lukács’ works from around 1930 as »later criticism«. At an-
other point, she also refers to his criticism of experimental writing as put 
forth in the 1950s. This seemingly unproblematic limitation of the ›later‹ 
Lukács to his ›politically controversial‹ aesthetics implicitly restages an in-
grained yet commonly unnoticed disregard of Lukács’ late ontological and 
aesthetic opus magnum. Fredric Jameson also reminds that Lukács’ work is 
commonly divided into »early Lukács«, »the later theoretician of realism«, 
and the »final Lukács«.6 In contrast to Butler, he does take into account 
the final phase, yet he also mentions that this phase is usually construed in 
terms of a »return to the beginning«, and that it is often implied that this 
return, undertaken »from a Marxist point of view«, testifies to »the failure 
and the vanity of the whole enterprise«.7 It goes without saying that the lat-
ter assertion, as critically referenced by Jameson, refers first and foremost 
to Lukács’ radical years. Against assertions such as these and other possible 
platitudes, I demonstrate several aspects that not only endorse Jameson’s 
thesis on Lukács’ work as a »progressive exploration and enlargement of a 
single complex of problems«,8 but also help to illuminate the specific char-
acter of this progression and enlargement.
Taking the lead of his doctoral thesis from Thomas Metscher’s estima-
tion that Lukács’ »späte Ästhetik ist, von wenigen verdienstvollen Ausnah-
men […] abgesehen, ein nicht rezipiertes Werk«,9 Daniel Göcht sets out to 
3 Jameson: The Case for Georg Lukács, p. 163.
4 Butler: Introduction, p. 3.
5 Ibid.
6 Jameson: The Case for Georg Lukács, p. 163.
7 Ibid., p. 163, 162, 163.
8 Ibid.
9 Ein ungelesenes, unbekanntes Meisterwerk des 20. Jahrhunderts. Gespräch mit Thomas Metscher. 
In: Georg Lukács und 1968. Eine Spurensuche. Ed. Rüdiger Dannemann. Bielefeld: Aisthesis 
2009, pp. 149–156, here 153. Qtd. in Göcht: Mimesis – Subjektivität – Realismus, p. 9.
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demonstrate that attentive readings of Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen may 
also shed a new light on the very beginnings of Lukács’ aesthetic preoccupa-
tions. In support of this, I posit that an updated assessment of Die Eigenart 
enables us to also revalue the work of the ›middle‹ – or »later«10 or »ma-
ture«11 – Lukács, which often casts him as a normativistic, propagandistic, 
and »dogmatic«12 thinker. In other words, both Lukács’ early and mature 
aesthetics should be read as preliminaries and a prolegomenon to his final, 
extensive aesthetic theory that simultaneously credits art for its form-related 
specificity and social autonomy and acknowledges the indispensability of its 
content-related commentary and commitment in particular historical times 
and social spaces. The interest in the specificity of the aesthetic is not exclu-
sively a concern of late Lukács, but it is doggedly consistent throughout all 
his creative phases – both his early and late work but arguably his politically 
charged writings from the late 1920s and 1930s as well. However, as militant 
revolutionary and, thereafter, state-socialist Soviet politics was reluctant to 
accept integrative approaches,13 it was not before Die Eigenart that Lukács 
managed to consolidate his Marxist and materialist stance on literature as 
a vehicle for »a deeper probing of the real world«14 with an interest in »die 
philosophische Begründung der ästhetischen Setzungsart, die Ableitung der 
spezifischen Kategorie der Ästhetik [und] ihre Abgrenzung von anderen 
Gebieten«.15 In what follows, my aim in drawing on Lukács’ early work is 
to comparatively review his late aesthetics not as an arguably resumptive 
liberal philosophy16 but as a theoretical completion of the ›aesthetics of 
content‹ (›Inhaltsästhetik‹) that was originally endorsed in his mature years, 
and for which the work from the early years serves as a preliminary phase.
My integrative assessment of Lukács’ early, mature, and late aesthetics 
hopes to shed light on the continuity of his attempts at finding a dialectical 
synthesis to the age-old rift between form and content, art and life, the 
self and society (inner life and outside world), freedom and oppression, 
10 Butler: Introduction, p. 3.
11 Arato/Breines: Young Lukács, p. 221.
12 Adorno: Reconciliation under Duress, p. 154 (Erpreßte Versöhnung, p. 255).
13 Lukács’ subsequent attempts at developing a Popular Front strategy avant la lettre were stifled 
(cf. Rees: Introduction, pp. 32–35; Jay: Marxism and Totality, p. 103).
14 Lukács: Realism in the Balance, p. 37 (»ein tieferes Erforschen der Wirklichkeit«, Es geht um 
den Realismus, p. 322).
15 Lukács: Die Eigenart I, p. 7 (brackets in the original).
16 For the ›liberal‹ traits of Lukács’ aesthetics, as well as for the links he establishes between Marx 
and classical German aesthetics, or Marxism and bourgeois humanism, cf. Jay: Marxism and 
Totality, pp. 301–302.
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modernism and realism, capitalism and Bolshevism.17 Yet these consistent 
strivings for mediation should not be understood in terms of a search for 
reconciliatory interim solutions but rather as a working out of the dialectical 
synthesis in the proper meaning of a »third and real solution«18 to the above 
mentioned, virtually false dilemmas; a solution that in Lukács’ case was 
not possible before socialism had been achieved. Finally, his perseverance 
in socialist perspectives for liberation also in light of socialism’s historical 
defeats was what has rendered his late aesthetics unintelligible to the aes-
thetic thought designed in conditions of Cold War capitalism and haunted 
by fundamental contradictions of committed art resulting therefrom.19
The line of my argument leads from the widely accepted opinion that 
Lukács’ early aesthetics gestured towards the necessity to act against alien-
ation, over an account of his revolutionary contributions to the struggle 
for the liberation of humankind (expressed in terms of politics as well as 
aesthetics), towards his late retake and reworking of issues that were occu-
pying him throughout the earlier stages of critical activity. The apodictic 
assumptions that underpin Lukács’ aesthetics and politics as a whole are 
as follows: First, human beings are social animals that create their own 
history. They are active not only through their work and labor but also 
through their cognitive, epistemological, and anthropological construal of 
the world they participate in and create through their social interaction. 
Second, as the opaque system of capitalist production renders individual 
attempts at understanding social reality impossible, it is only by means of 
strict epistemological procedures (provided first and foremost by scientific 
socialism) that social reality can be comprehended in its totality.
One major failure of bourgeois ideology – including philosophy, po-
litical economy, and the practices of quotidian life – has been the misap-
prehension of this totality. For Lukács, »what is false is not so much the 
content of classical middle-class philosophy as its form«,20 meaning that 
the bourgeois methodology isolated particular problems emerging in spe-
cific political and social constellations, without being able to grasp their 
historical and social dimension or to offer systemic critiques. Carriers of 
ideology intuitively worked against the understanding of the overall formal 
dimension of the phenomena in question and were, as a consequence, even 
17 Cf. ibid., p. 308.
18 Lukács: The Young Hegel, p. 521.
19 As regards other reasons for this unintelligibility, especially with respect to his understanding 
of totality and the revolutionary role of the proletariat, cf. Hartley: Politics of Style, pp. 173–177.
20 Jameson: The Case for Georg Lukács, p. 183; cf. Bernstein: The Philosophy of the Novel, pp. 11–12, 
68–69.
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hostile to changing them in any essential way. Third, one fundamental claim 
of Lukács’ aesthetics is that art, which is an epistemological domain strictly 
separated from science and in that respect »specific« (eigenartig),21 makes 
an important contribution to the emancipatory progress of humankind 
inasmuch as it reflects the human world in its own, evocative way.22 It is 
primarily in this evocative sense that »every art is realistic«.23 Simultane-
ously, by means of employing art’s specific forms and procedures (calibrated 
according to the system of art’s own presuppositions, rules, and material 
conditions), individual artworks not only reflect the human world, but are 
also able to impact this world and alter it. Thereof consists art’s not only 
strictly aesthetic but also its implicit social, ethical, and political commit-
ment and, unambiguously, the possible link between Lukács’ Die Eigenart 
and his early and mature aesthetics. 
2. ›Early‹, ›Mature‹, and ›Late‹ Lukács 
The aforementioned tripartite compartmentalization of Lukács’ opus in 
his early, mature, and final or late phase is also bound to suggest that his 
mature and late aesthetics of content – alongside the motto »Das determin-
ierende Prinzip ist der Inhalt«24 – stand out as irreconcilable with his early 
philological and philosophical interests in literary forms. This enforced yet 
common contrasting of the presumptively purely aesthetic concerns with 
the subsequent conversion to revolutionary contents, in whose backwash 
art should commit itself, falls short of one decisive dimension of form that 
continues to reverberate within all of Lukács’ theoretical endeavors. In his 
early work, the form is, namely, revealed not only as an asset of literary 
genres, or as a formal dimension of particular artworks, or even as »the 
essence of whatever has to be said«,25 but already as a way of mastering life: 
The bourgeois subject masters life by means of a willing subordination to 
the rules that establish and uphold rather uneventful and tedious everyday 
21 On the differences and common goals of art and science, cf. Lukács: Soul and Form, p. 18 (Die 
Seele und die Formen, p. 7); otherwise Lukács: Die Eigenart I, p. 483.
22 Lukács: Die Eigenart I, p. 704.
23 In the most general sense, every art is realistic (Lukács: Die Eigenart II, p. 804) because it 
unavoidably – under the condition that it is art – represents the tendencies of its particular 
historical time and social place.
24 Lukács: Die Eigenart I, p. 412.
25 Lukács: Soul and Form, p. 166 (»[D]ie Form ist eine so weit verdichtete Essenz alles zu Sagenden, 
daß wir nur mehr die Verdichtung herausfühlen, und kaum mehr, wovon sie die Verdichtung 
ist.«, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 307).
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life. This controlled and controlling life requires »cutting down the conduct 
of one’s life to a strictly and narrowly bourgeois measure«,26 with its heroes 
abiding by »[t]he things which befall them, not the things they do«.27 By 
contrast, the modern artist and philosopher, insurmountably opposed to 
this »bourgeois way of life«,28 uses the form as a refuge from forfeited life.29 
In this sense, the aesthetic form is employed as an intervention into the 
order of quotidian, compromise-oriented life management. It is already 
here that the ethical and potentially political problem of Lukács’ early work 
arises: His interest in aesthetic forms emerged, in fact, as a manifestation of 
an »attempt to come to grips with the contradictions of the aesthetic and 
ethical modes of life within a collapsing social world«.30 Read in this vein, 
Lukács’ early cultural criticism not only presaged the diagnosis of History 
and Class Consciousness (1923) – the loss of totality, visible in the obfusca-
tion of the insight into reality and a semi-religious, contemplative attitude 
toward products of human creativity and social interrelations – but also laid 
the groundwork for his lifelong insistence on the imperative of an ›ought‹. 
Initially voiced in the ideological framework of German phenomenolo-
gy and individualist psychology, this imperative was soon substantiated 
with a political, specifically revolutionary rationale. After the watershed 
that occurred with The Theory of the Novel and shifted his »tragic world 
view«31 towards a principle or even an imperative of hope,32 throughout all 
of his phases Lukács sustained his allegiance with the maxim: »Du mußt 
dein Leben ändern!«33 The final formulation of this ›ought‹ or ›Du-mußt‹ 
principle is submitted in Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen and reads as follows: 
Auch das idyllischste Lied oder das einfachste Stilleben drückt in einem bestimmten Sinn 
ein Sollen aus; es richtet sich an den Menschen des Alltags mit der Aufforderung, jene 
26 Ibid., p. 74 (»das Niederschrauben der Lebensführung auf das Maß des streng Bürgerlichen«, 
Die Seele und die Formen, p. 122).
27 Ibid., p. 84 (»Das, was ihnen widerfährt — nicht das, was sie tun«, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 
143).
28 Ibid., p. 74 (»Bourgeoisdasein«, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 123).
29 For the difference between the categories of ›life‹ and ›living‹, cf. Crow (Form and the Unifi-
cation of Aesthetics and Ethics, pp. 164–165): »The categories of ›life‹ and ›living‹ signify that 
a distinction is to be made between the bare fact of personal existence and the form or value 
through which life becomes meaningful. ›Living‹ is an expression of the life of the soul which 
is objectified in artistic forms.«
30 Ibid., p. 163.
31 Löwy: Georg Lukács, p. 97.
32 Ibid., p. 109. For Lukács’ later criticism of this tragic stance (and especially of Georg Simmel), 
cf. Jay: Marxism and Totality, pp. 107–108.
33 Lukács: Die Eigenart I, p. 779.
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Einheit und Höhe, die im Werk verwirklicht erscheint, ebenfalls zu erreichen. Es ist das 
Sollen jeden erfüllten Lebens.34
Although this did not seem so from the perspective of 1911, the ideologi-
cal analyses of History and Class Consciousness were merely one step away 
from the cultural criticism deployed in Soul and Form. The step that came 
in between was The Theory of the Novel, of which Jay M. Bernstein, who 
made an unequivocal case for interpreting Lukács’ »pre-Marxist theory 
of the novel from the perspective of his Marxist social theory«,35 said that 
there we already »have the rudiments of a Marxist theory of the novel«.36 
Clearly, in Soul and Form Lukács was not yet able to argue against a »met-
aphysische[] Überspannung der Selbstständigkeit«37 of the sphere of art. 
Nevertheless, although he was far from explicitly stating that art arises »aus 
der breiten Basis des Alltagslebens«38 and that its results, in the end, flow 
back again to everyday life (which again renders the independency of the 
sphere of art merely »relative«),39 the analyses in Soul and Form registered 
a »zeitpsychologisch«40 crisis and discussed art and literature in close ex-
change with society. They also evinced the realistic »Grundfaktum«41 of the 
indispensable material origins of the quotidian aesthetic sensible: »historical 
feelings were for them [bourgeois writers] life-feelings«.42 Simultaneously, 
art as human praxis was understood not as a historically and socially un-
encumbered phenomenon of universal artistic value but unambiguously 
34 Ibid., pp. 481–482. Cf. the related romantic imperative in Soul and Form: »It is the ancient 
dream of a golden age. But their golden age is not a refuge in a past that has been lost forever, 
only to be glimpsed from time to time in beautiful old legends – it is a goal whose attainment 
is the central duty of everyone.« (p. 65) (»Es ist der uralte Traum von einem goldenen Zeitalter. 
Doch ihr goldenes Zeitalter ist kein ewig verlorener Hort vergangener Zeiten, der nur noch in 
schönen Märchen manchmal spukt, es ist das Ziel, dessen Erreichen jedermanns Lebenspflicht 
ist.«, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 104)
35 Bernstein: The Philosophy of the Novel, p. viii; cf. p. 42.
36 Ibid., p. x. Bernstein concurs with Fredric Jameson, who in The Theory of the Novel discerns 
elements of a »shift from a metaphysical to a historical view of the world that will be ratified by 
Lukács’ conversion to Marxism« (Jameson: The Case for Georg Lukács, p. 182). Jameson also 
posits that »if Lukács became a Communist, it was precisely because the problems of narration 
raised in the Theory of the Novel required a Marxist framework to be thought through to their 
logical conclusion« (ibid.). 
37 Lukács: Die Eigenart I, p. 489.
38 Ibid., p. 488.
39 Ibid., cf. pp. 483–484.
40 Lukács: Die Seele und die Formen, p. 136.
41 Lukács: Die Eigenart I, p. 488.
42 Lukács: Soul and Form, p. 81 (»[Das heißt,] daß bei ihnen die historischen Empfindungen zu 
Lebensgefühlen, zu praktisch wirksamen Lebensfaktoren geworden waren [...].«, Die Seele und 
die Formen, p. 137).
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also as a materialization of a particular historical subject: »In their works, 
the bourgeois way of life assumes historic stature.«43
What is usually referenced to as Lukács’ pre-Marxist romantic anti-cap-
italism44 was not an individual inclination but a hallmark of a generation; an 
aesthetic reaction to the loss of totality as a mourned ›Obdach‹.45 Once the 
shelter from the incertitude of modern life disappeared and »the river beds, 
now dry beyond all hope, have marked forever the face of the earth«,46 the 
concept of totality came to represent the forsaken certainty and an almost pan-
theist identity with the whole – humanity, genus, lifeworld.47 It is with respect 
to the idea of totality, I recur, that the early problem of form, which gestured 
towards problems of ethics, prefigured not only Lukács’ soon conversion to 
Marxism, but opened up a set of conceptual configurations that were readopt-
ed in his late aesthetics. Within this framework, Die Eigenart emerges as a 
critical resumption of the early problems of ethics and their integration in the 
setting of political and aesthetic solutions that Lukács subsequently proposed 
and agreed to in the post-revolutionary decades. Here, it is the viewpoint of 
specifically socialist totality that proves to be determining: If the early ethi-
cal problem – crystallized in the question »how can life become essence«,48 
become meaningful (»wesenhaft«)49 – was doomed to remain unresolved, in 
the subsequent decades it was the perspective of socialism that allowed for 
solutions to this typically modern conundrum. In 1953, when he was already 
working on his aesthetic »grande œvre de synthèse«,50 particular episodes of 
the magnificent project of establishing socialism may have seemed flawed, 
but for Lukács this did not diminish socialism’s historical and global signif-
icance. In Die Eigenart’s final chapter (»Der Befreiungskampf der Kunst«),51 
he conceded that building socialism was by no means an easy task: 
Darin steckt die von uns dargestellte Schwierigkeit: im Sozialismus, in der sozialistischen 
Kultur jene Kraft aufzuzeigen, die imstande ist, diesen Befreiungskampf siegreich zu Ende zu 
führen. […] Die Frage, in der unsere Betrachtungen kulminieren, ist die einer welthistorischen 
Perspektive. [...] Für uns kommt es auf die Perspektive der Gesamtentwicklung an [...].52 
43 Ibid. (»In ihren Werken wird das Bürgertum historisch.«, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 138)
44 Löwy: Georg Lukács, p. 97; Jay: Marxism and Totality, p. 85; Rees: Introduction, p. 4; Butler: 
Introduction, p. 1.
45 Cf. Lukács: The Theory of the Novel, p. 41; Lukács: Die Theorie des Romans, p. 32.
46 Ibid., p. 38 (»[D]ie hoffnungslos ausgetrockneten Strombetten haben das Antlitz der Welt für 
immer zerklüftet.«, Die Theorie des Romans, p. 30).
47 On totality as Lukács’ continuous obsession, cf. Jay: Marxism and Totality, pp. 301–302.
48 Lukács: The Theory of the Novel, p. 30.
49 Lukács: Die Theorie des Romans, p. 22, 27.
50 Göcht: Mimesis – Subjektivität – Realismus, p. 49, cf. p. 35; cf. Lukács: Die Eigenart I, p. 25.
51 Lukács: Die Eigenart II, pp. 648–835.
52 Ibid., p. 833.
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3. Irreconcilable Counterparts: Early Aesthetics and Ethics
Although with the benefit of hindsight one can entertain a claim that in his 
early years Lukács already acted as a »revolutionary without a revolution«,53 
it is glaringly apparent that the only viable path for him in the pre-1918 
period was the aesthetic one. As John Rees suggests in his Introduction to 
the new edition of the essay Tailism and the Dialectic (1926/2000), in this 
period there was hope that »[p]erhaps brief moments of artistic experi-
ence might overcome the alienation from modern political forms«.54 Yet 
the considered aesthetic solutions were not possible precisely because the 
problems were defined from the standpoint of aesthetics exclusively. That 
said, the whole project of Soul and Form rose and fell due to its limitation to 
aesthetic approaches. Even if the respective essays did not delimit themselves 
to aesthetic matters (as if this were possible in the first place), but already 
systematically touched upon ethical issues – upon matters of ›soul‹ rather 
than those of ›form‹ exclusively – the fallacious stance of an ›either-art-or-
life‹ aesthetics precluded both interpersonal ethics and collective politics 
and thus served as both the outset and the endpoint of analysis.55 As for our 
contemporary problems, the significance of Soul and Form lies precisely in 
its »suggestion that aesthetics alone fails to provide analogues for personal, 
social and, especially, political life«56 – which is a suggestion that is insuffi-
ciently acclaimed in belabored discourses on what in common parlance is 
called the ›politics of aesthetics‹ (e.g., in the laudatory reception of Jacques 
Ranciere).57 In contrast to Soul and Form’s negative diagnoses, Die Eigenart 
unambiguously acclaimed ethics as the final criterion: 
Überhaupt ist die Ethik das eigentliche Gebiet für den realen Entscheidungskampf zwis-
chen Diesseitigkeit und Jenseitigkeit, für die reale aufhebend-aufbewahrende Umgestaltung 
der menschlichen Partikularität. Eine endgültige Antwort auf die hier auftauchenden 
Probleme kann also nur in einer Ethik gegeben werden.58
At the core of both The Theory of the Novel and Soul and Form stands a 
belief that in modernity, art and life necessarily part ways; their fusion 
53 Arato/Breines: Young Lukács, pp. 3–12. For a critical assessment of such a »linear continuity 
of Lukács’ moves from aesthetics to ethics to politics«, cf. Crow: Form and the Unification of 
Aesthetics and Ethics, pp. 161–162.
54 Rees: Introduction, p. 4.
55 Cf. ibid. On the »standpoint of art«, cf. Lukács: Soul and Form, p. 99.
56 Crow: Form and the Unification of Aesthetics and Ethics, p. 176.
57 For critical voices, cf. Sonderegger: Neue Formen der Organisierung; Ventura: Gegen Kunsttheorie; 
Perica: Aisthesis verorten.
58 Lukács: Die Eigenart II, p. 800. Ethics reappears as decisive for the so-called »vermittelnde 
Mitte« not only in aesthetics but also in law theory. Cf. Die Eigenart II, p. 201.
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either leads to a violent reconciliation (annihilation of art through forms 
of compromised ordinariness) or to a likewise violent artistic renuncia-
tion of the forms of quotidian life. If the first option is made at the price 
of the aforementioned »cutting down the conduct of one’s life to a strictly 
and narrowly bourgeois measure«,59 the second decision is made for the 
sake of a real, that is, »honest« (»ehrlich«)60 life. In Soul and Form’s essay 
on »the seducer«, Sören Kierkegaard, and »the jilted girl«,61 his fiancée 
Regine Olsen,62 we encounter an opposition of the »merely relative« and 
the »absolute«63 life – an opposition that leans against the logic of an irre-
solvable ›either-or‹. This binary logic reemerges on many later occasions, 
for instance in the opposition of »man« and »troll«,64 or in the distinction 
between »Kern« and »Schale«.65 With the risk of preempting myself, allow 
me to remark that although my claim on the synthetic procedures of Die 
Eigenart des Ästhetischen suggests a dismissal of this either-or logic that con-
stituted the liberal Lukács to the same extent as the Marxist Lukács, the real 
significance of Die Eigenart lies in a by no means paradoxical maintaining 
of the ›either-or‹ logic and a simultaneous transmission of this logic onto 
another level of argumentation, as well as in a substantiation of this logic 
on a less political and rather profoundly anthropological basis.
There is, however, a dimension that sets Soul and Form apart from all 
Lukács’ later works.66 If The Theory of the Novel recognized art (literature) as 
potentially successful on its way towards a revolutionary transformation of the 
quotidian, fragmented »whole man« (»ganzer Mensch«) towards the utterly 
human »man as a whole« (»Mensch ganz«),67 in Soul and Form it was blatantly 
obvious that »there is no point in-between«.68 In this regard, Kierkegaard’s 
high-handed position was admittedly only romantic and sentimental.69 This 
59 Lukács: Soul and Form, p. 74 (Die Seele und die Formen, p. 122).
60 Ibid., p. 45 (Die Seele und die Formen, p. 64).
61 Ibid., p. 47 (»der Verführer und das verlassene Mädchen«, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 68).
62 »The Foundering of Form Against Life: Søren Kierkegaard and Regine Olsen«, ibid., pp. 44 –58 
(»Das Zerschellen der Form am Leben: Sören Kierkegaard und Regine Olsen«, Die Seele und 
die Formen, pp. 61–90).
63 Ibid., p. 47 (Die Seele und die Formen, p. 69).
64 The opposition stems from Henrik Ibsen’s play Peer Gynt, with the troll abiding by the motto 
»Troll, sei dir selbst genug« (Lukács: Die Eigenart II, p. 381).
65 Cf. the chapter »Der Mensch als Kern oder Schale« (Lukács: Die Eigenart I, pp. 740–764).
66 For a comprehensive elaboration on the ›specificity‹ of the Specificity of the Aesthetic in the 
context of Lukács’ work as a whole, cf. Johnson: Die Eigenart des Aesthetischen.
67 Cf. the chapter »Homogenes Medium, der ganze Mensch und der ›Mensch ganz‹« (ibid., pp. 
606–635).
68 Löwy: Georg Lukács, p. 102.
69 Lukács: Soul and Form, p. 51 (Die Seele und die Formen, p. 77).
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brings Kierkegaard close to Novalis and the circle of German poets around the 
journal »Athäneum«,70 of whom Lukács maintained that »[t]he actual reality 
of life vanished before their eyes and was replaced by another reality, the reality 
of poetry, of pure psyche. They created a homogeneous, organic world unified 
within itself and identified it with the real world.«71 What Lukács claimed 
about the Romantic generation is applicable also to the romantic anti-cap-
italism of his own intellectual and social belonging: A retreat into aesthetic 
discussions functioned not only as a signal of the loss of reality, but was also 
by the same token inscribed in the very social condition of the autonomy of 
art in capitalist modernity; and it was only at the price of losing the precise 
relation of art and life that the erecting of a coherent and organic world of 
art and poetry became possible.72 Therefore, although in Soul and Form one 
cannot ignore the presence of a »Spannung zwischen Fülle des Möglichen 
und Bestimmtheit des Wirklichen«,73 of a »Verhältnis zwischen rationalem 
Erfassen und der irrationalen Hingabe«,74 or of a irreconcilable rift between 
Eckhardtian vita activa and vita contemplativa,75 one also cannot determine 
any indicator of a synthetic junction of these opposites.
The irreconcilability of the two constituents of an opposition, of thesis 
and antithesis, is the decisive theoretical procedure in Soul and Form: »The 
difference is whether the life-problems of a particular life arise in the form 
of an either/or, or whether ›as well as‹ is the proper formula when the split 
appears.«76 For Kierkegaard, the decision was to create life according to 
70 Cf. the essay »On the Romantic Philosophy of Life: Novalis«, ibid., p. 59–72 (»Zur romantischen 
Lebensphilosophie: Novalis«, Die Seele und die Formen, pp. 91–119).
71 Ibid., p. 67 (»Die tatsächliche Realität des Lebens entschwand vor ihren Blicken und wurde 
von einer anderen, von der poetischen, der rein seelischen ersetzt. Sie schufen eine homogene, 
in sich einheitliche und organische Welt und identifizierten diese mit der tatsächlichen.«, Die 
Seele und die Formen, p. 109).
72 In The Theory of the Novel, one reads a claim on Novalis that is by the same token applicable to 
young Lukács’ historical time and ideological and social space: »His reality is so much weighed 
down by the earthly gravity of idealessness, his transcendent world is so airy, so vapid, because 
it stems too directly from the philosophico-postulative sphere of pure abstraction, that the two 
are unable to unite in a living totality.« (p. 140) (»Die Wirklichkeit ist allzu behaftet und beladen 
von der Erdenschwere ihrer Ideenverlassenheit, und die transzendente Welt ist zu luftig und 
inhaltslos wegen ihrer allzu direkten Abstammung aus der philosophisch-postulativen Sphäre 
des abstrakten Überhaupt, als daß sie sich zur Gestaltung einer lebendigen Totalität organisch 
vereinigen könnten.«, Die Theorie des Romans, p. 125)
73 Largier: Zeit der Möglichkeit, p. 12.
74 Ibid., p. 13.
75 Ibid., p. 24, 81.
76 Lukács: Soul and Form, p. 47 (»Dies ist der Unterschied, ob die Lebensprobleme in der Form von 
›entweder – oder‹ aufgeworfen sind, oder ob ›sowohl als auch‹ der wirkliche Ausdruck dafür 
ist, wenn sich die Wege einmal zu verzweigen scheinen.«, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 69).
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the principles of honesty, that is, of art. No reconciliation (let alone ›under 
duress‹) and no »petty compromises«77 were conceivable. Although one can 
forefeel the strictness and radicalism of Lukács’ later political and ideolog-
ical solutions to social problems, here it was art and only art that offered 
»salvation from loneliness and chaos«.78 Thus, the fundamental principle 
of Lukács’ early aesthetics – according to which only »the form of individ-
ual life«79 was able to »embrace the totality of life«80 – was captured in a 
deadlock: The poet’s life form remained relentless in light of the quotidian 
obstinacy of the bourgeois forms of life; and vice versa, the life content was 
too resistant to be subdued to the design of an art form. As a consequence, 
the aesthetic proved to be unable to seize life and render it meaningful. In 
contrast to the subsequent period, when it became clear that the embraced 
revolutionary politics, alongside its aesthetics, was viable only and exclu-
sively when it acted as the »servant of ethics«,81 in Soul and Form no such 
ranking is discernible. 
In The Theory of the Novel, however, the estimation of art’s distance from 
society altered. Here, the novel was claimed to mimetically reflect the ethical 
problems of the epoch; simultaneously, thanks to a specifically human intel-
lectual objectification (Vergegenständlichung) it was also rendered capable of 
intervening in its own time and space. After the identity of the individual and 
the whole had ceased to hold sway over humanity and as it could not, under 
any circumstances, be regained, it was only the novel – »essentially an epic 
form of the very impossibility of epic«82 – that could attempt a contribution 
to the search for the forlorn total experience. This should not be understood 
as a resurrection of paradise lost but as a modern, updated production of a 
non-transcendent, this-worldly home (»diesseitige[] Heimat«).83 Therefore, 
if it is understood that Soul and Form »culminate[d] in the revelation of the 
failure of form and the inadequacy of its aesthetic expression to represent 
life«,84 it is in The Theory of the Novel that the novelistic form obtained its 
proper Lukácsian »ethical significance«:85 »This aesthetic problem, however, 
is at root an ethical one, and its artistic solution therefore presupposes, in 
77 Ibid., p. 48 (»flache[] Kompromisse«, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 71).
78 Ibid., p. 67 (»die Rettung aus der Einsamkeit und aus dem Chaos«, Die Seele und die Formen, 
p. 108).
79 Crow: Form and the Unification of Aesthetics and Ethics, p. 176.
80 Ibid.
81 Löwy: Georg Lukács, p. 127.
82 Bivens: Epic and Exile, p. 10.
83 Lukács: Die Theorie des Romans, p. 117. 
84 Crow: Form and the Unification of Aesthetics and Ethics, p. 171.
85 Jameson: The Case for Georg Lukács, p. 173; cf. Löwy: Georg Lukács, p. 99.
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accordance with the formal laws of the novel, that a solution has been found to 
the ethical problem.«86 This solution – and this is the turning point in Lukács’ 
argumentation – already implies the imperative that a »rounded correction 
of reality be translated into actions«.87 Yet although the critical potential for 
ethical and political intervention begins to emerge here, this does not mean 
(and for Lukács would never mean) that the novel alone can offer feasible 
solutions to the overall problems detected: »To create, by purely artistic 
means, a reality which corresponds to this dream world, or at least is more 
adequate to it than the existing one, is only an illusory solution.«88 The novel 
merely contains and preserves a seemingly lost relation to totality, moreover, 
it literally »thinks in terms of totality«.89 Nevertheless, in the same way as the 
central character of the novel is rendered problematic90 and in the same way 
as the aforementioned »actions« are feasible merely as actions that »prove the 
individual’s right to self-sufficiency«,91 so does totality in the novel emerge not 
as a political or community project but as a problem.92 For instance, Lukács 
was explicit about the fact that the modern novel of education designs a 
hero who »accommodates himself to society by resigning himself to accept 
its life forms«.93 Thus, the novel exhibits a man whose accommodation in 
the given world is
neither a protest against it nor an affirmation of it, only an understanding and expe-
riencing of it which tries to be fair to both sides and which ascribes the soul’s inability 
86 Lukács: The Theory of the Novel, p. 115 (»Dieses ästhetische Problem ist jedoch in seinen 
letzten Wurzeln ein ethisches; seine künstlerische Lösung hat deshalb – den Formgesetzen des 
Romans entsprechend – das Überwinden der ethischen Problematik, die es verursacht, zur 
Voraussetzung.«, Die Theorie des Romans, p. 101). Lukács returns to this appreciation of The 
Theory of the Novel in the preface of Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen (I, p. 25): »Schon die ›Theorie 
des Romans‹, entstanden im ersten Kriegsjahr, richtet sich mehr auf geschichtsphilosophische 
Probleme, für welche die ästhetischen nur Symptome, Signale sein sollten. Dann traten Ethik, 
Geschichte, Ökonomie immer stärker in den Mittelpunkt meiner Interessen. Ich wurde Marxist, 
und das Jahrzehnt meiner aktiven politischen Tätigkeit ist zugleich die Periode einer inneren 
Auseinandersetzung mit dem Marxismus, die seiner wirklichen Aneignung.«
87 Lukács: The Theory of the Novel, p. 115 (»[...] kann diese abgeschlossene Korrektur der Wirk-
lichkeit sich in Taten umsetzen [...]«, Die Theorie des Romans, p. 101). 
88 Ibid. (»Das rein künstlerische Schaffen einer Wirklichkeit, die dieser Traumwelt entspricht 
oder ihr wenigstens angemessener ist als die tatsächlich vorgefundene, ist nur eine scheinbare 
Lösung.«, Die Theorie des Romans, p. 101)
89 Ibid., p. 56 (»[…] Gesinnung zur Totalität hat«, Die Theorie des Romans, p. 44).
90 Ibid., p. 136 (Die Theorie des Romans, p. 147).
91 Ibid., p. 115 (»das Recht des Individuums auf diese Selbstherrlichkeit«, Die Theorie des Romans, 
p. 120).
92 Ibid., p. 56 (Die Theorie des Romans, p. 44).
93 Ibid., p. 136 (»das Sichabfinden mit der Gesellschaft im resignierten Aufsichnehmen ihrer 
Lebensformen«, Die Theorie des Romans, p. 147).
Perica: Tertium datur ZGB 29/2020, 183–208
196
to fulfil itself in the world not only to the inessential nature of the world but also to the 
feebleness of the soul.94
And so it came about that only after the final conclusions of The Theory 
of the Novel had been drawn, the »frontier between literature and politics, 
aesthetics and revolution«95 could take its course. Henceforth, it was not 
aesthetics but politics that was assigned the duty to liberate the world, and it 
was unreservedly determined by ethics as its leading principle.96 The noto-
riously secondary status of literature resulting hereof nurtured accusations 
that for Lukács, literature ostensibly served as a mere ancilla of politics; 
his contemporary warnings that art and literature cease to be autonomous 
domains as soon as they are used as plain ideological tools or illustrations 
of social and political contents continue to be ignored in these accusations.97 
In contrast to this difficult international reputation, Lukács warned against 
the »net of contradictions« (»Fangnetz der Widersprüche«)98 early on: he 
claimed that artworks can – and are in fact obliged to – avoid the erroneous 
opposition between »pure art« (or »Formvollendung«) and »tendency«.99 
This claim was to reemerge in his late aesthetics in terms of a more straight-
forward claim on the social commitment of artworks only and exclusively 
as autonomous artifacts. That said, in his perspective, the political ›uses‹ 
of literature can be pondered upon only under the condition that literature 
acts as literature. The reason why Lukács continues to be cast as a dogmatic 
thinker is that it was not until his late – and unread – Die Eigenart that he 
succeeded in elaborating on the specificity of this as and to find it in art’s 
typically human evocation, as well as in the synthetic procedures provided 
by its so-called homogenous medium, which is defined as follows: 
Ein homogenes Medium im Sinne der Ästhetik kann nur gebildet werden, wenn das 
anfängliche Einengen der Widerspiegelung der Wirklichkeit und das, was durch diesen 
spezifischen Sinn wahrnehmbar ist, nur ein Mittel dazu bildet, einen zugleich spezifischen 
94 Ibid. (»[…] weder ein Protest dagegen noch seine Bejahung: nur ein verstehendes Erleben; 
ein Erleben, das gegen beide Seiten gerecht zu werden bestrebt ist und das in dem Sich-nicht-
auswirken-Können der Seele in der Welt nicht nur die Wesenlosigkeit dieser, sondern auch die 
innere Schwäche jener erblickt.«, Die Theorie des Romans, p. 148)
95 Löwy: Georg Lukács, p. 111.
96 This applies to Lukács’ political activism as well. He even »sought to analyze Bolshevism as if 
he were still answering the old problem of how a person can behave ethically in a totally sinful 
world« (Rees: Introduction, p. 9). In the course of the post-revolutionary discussions in the 
Third International, this turned out to be a stumbling block that compelled Lukács to exert 
self-criticism. Cf. Lukács: Tailism and the Dialectic.
97 Cf., for instance, a remark by Juliane Rebentisch, namely that Lukács’ »model reduces the func-
tion of art to illustrating vividly what has already been understood« (Realism Today, p. 248).
98 Lukács: Tendenz oder Parteilichkeit?, p. 17.
99 Ibid., p. 15.
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und totalen Aspekt der Welt in der so entstandenen neuartigen Weise abzubilden und 
sinnbildlich festzuhalten. [...] Das homogene Medium ist deshalb nur in seiner ersten 
Unmittelbarkeit ein bloß formales Prinzip.100 
It follows that for the pursuit of a ›continuity thesis‹ – deployed not only 
by a series of theoreticians such as Andrew Arato, Werner Jung, Gyorgy 
Marcus, or Pauline Johnson,101 but asserted also by Lukács himself102 – the 
term ›romantic anti-capitalism‹ does not suffice as a qualification that could 
consolidate Lukács’ early cultural criticism with the subsequent stages of his 
intellectual development. Concomitantly, to insist on form as a red thread 
in Lukács’ long work would underexpose the form’s dialectical relationship 
with the content, without which no form would be thinkable in the first place. 
Although statements such as »the essay has a form which separates it, with the 
rigor of a law, from all other art forms«103 may support a formalistic reading 
of Soul and Form, what relates these essays to all of Lukács’ later theoretical 
interventions is not just a formal account of art forms but more especially 
the interest in an integrative form-content unity. As adumbrated above, ›form‹ 
indeed appears first in the dimension of an ethics of the self, i.e., in the sense 
of mastering life. Secondly, it is discussed in its materialistic relation to the 
content, precisely as a form that »is not added on to expression, but becomes 
its condition, the sign and possibility of its subjective and objective truth«.104 
These early properties of the form reappear in Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen 
in an almost unaltered guise; the form adjoins with the content in a way that 
»die ästhetische Form […] stets die Form eines bestimmten Inhalts ist«.105 
However, in Die Eigenart, this mediating form-content-unity carries wider 
social significance, which in Soul and Form proves to be inexistent. Here, I 
believe that Die Eigenart’s social extension of form-content-unity can be inter-
100 Lukács: Die Eigenart I, p. 611.
101 Cf. Göcht: Mimesis – Subjektivität – Realismus, pp. 33–50.
102 Lukács: Gelebtes Denken, p. 132: »Bei mir ist jede Sache die Fortsetzung von etwas. Ich glaube, 
in meiner Entwicklung gibt es keine anorganischen Elemente.«
103 The full quote reads as follows: »I speak here of criticism as a form of art, I do so in the name 
of order (i.e., almost purely symbolically and non-essentially), and solely on the strength of my 
feeling that the essay has a form which separates it, with the rigor of a law, from all other art 
forms. I want to try to define the essay as strictly as is possible, precisely by describing it as an 
art form.« (Lukács: Soul and Form, p. 17, emphasis I. P.) (»Wenn ich aber hier von dem Essay als 
einer Kunstform spreche, so tue ich es im Namen der Ordnung (also fast rein symbolisch und 
uneigentlich); nur aus der Empfindung heraus, daß er eine Form hat, die ihn mit endgültiger 
Gesetzesstrenge von allen anderen Kunstformen trennt. Ich versuche den Essay so scharf wie 
überhaupt möglich zu isolieren eben dadurch, daß ich ihn jetzt als Kunstform bezeichne.«, Die 
Seele und die Formen, p. 5)
104 Butler: Introduction, p. 2.
105 Lukács: Die Eigenart I, p. 758.
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preted as a reverberation of his early ›formalistic‹ interests – a reverberation 
that is, however, unthinkable without taking into account the inherited assets 
of Lukács’ subsequent turn to Marxism and revolutionary politics. 
4. Synthetic Procedures in Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen
Placing his arguments at a critical distance from mechanicist understandings 
of reflection theory, in Die Eigenart Lukács reached out for the dialectical 
method of negation of negation: There, the condemnation of liberal aes-
thetics, typical for the interwar cultural left, was rectified with a stance in 
support of those strings of the liberal tradition that provided socialist art with 
dimensions which warrant its status as art, without however compromising 
it with subjectivism, fatalism, and magical or allegorical interpretations of 
reality. By doing so, Lukács safeguarded the aesthetic against the utilitarian 
demands on committed and revolutionary art that tended to subject the 
aesthetic realm to a political tooling: 
Und in verständlicher Opposition dagegen wurde nun in verschiedenen Richtungen, von 
der vulgären Tendenzkunst und der sogenannten ›littérature engagée‹ bis zur Auffassung 
vieler Theoretiker der sozialistischen Parteilichkeit, sehr zum Schaden des Verständnisses 
dessen, was an der Kunst wirklich künstlerisch ist, das relativ Berechtigte der Interesselo-
sigkeit als Moment im ästhetischen Gesamtprozeß einfach eliminiert.106
Although it may seem to the inexperienced eye that Lukács thus repudiated 
his own earlier positions, he in fact reinforced a synthetic procedure that 
ripened as early as in History and Class Consciousness – a synthesis of pol-
itics and ethics he was compelled to dismiss after scathing criticism from 
the critics of the Third International.107 A similar attempt at synthesis and 
its subsequent dismissal was to an extent restaged after the appearance of 
his 1928 »Blum-Theses«, originally a political program proposed to the 
Hungarian Communist Party, which turned out to be as »premature«108 as 
the theoretical step forward from 1923. 
If these synthetic procedures were strongly rejected by the Third Inter-
national, they were, in different ways and for different reasons, also largely 
ignored by the adherents of Lukács’ revival in the 1960s: The specifically 
aesthetic procedures of synthesis, as elaborated in Die Eigenart des Ästhe-
tischen, remained below the radar of international socialist intellectual 
forces that were primarily interested in the political treatise History and 
106 Ibid., p. 616.
107 Cf. Lukács: Tailism and the Dialectic.
108 Rees: Introduction, p. 30.
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Class Consciousness. One of the reasons for a shift of focus away from a 
systemically thought-through Marxist aesthetics was that in the 1960s the 
idea of art that could dutifully make its own contribution to the liberation 
of humankind was radically abandoned, which was a side effect of the 
dismissal of the classical concept of political revolution in favor of an aes-
thetically marked subversion. Namely, Western intellectuals had already 
become accustomed to the stance that »art under capitalism is art under 
capitalism«109 and considered alternatives, if not as entirely impossible, as 
necessarily entertaining a harrowing series of paradoxes. In return, »[t]he 
end of political illusions […] retroactively shed light on the end of aesthetic 
illusions«.110 So it came about that while Lukács in the socialist East enjoyed 
the status of a tolerated persona non grata, in the capitalist West, apart from 
valuable exceptions, he was also being read only selectively.111
In his late aesthetics, Lukács argued against a Manichean opposition 
of form and content (or, expressed in his early terminology, of ›form‹ and 
›soul‹) because it adheres to a system of »false extremes«.112 As remarked 
above, Lukács’ thinking in dichotomies was, in fact, never marked by sheer 
exclusivism: Even if in Soul and Form the »Horizont der Vermittlung«113 was 
rendered hopelessly inaccessible and any attempt at mediation discarded as 
futile, in the treatise on the essay114 we, in fact, encounter adumbrations that 
recently have been recognized as a »Suspendierung sowohl der Enthebung ins 
Allgemeine wie auch der Absorption durch das Besondere«.115 Simultaneously, 
it would be false to assume that the early interest in forms outweighed the 
importance of contents, or that in the subsequent decades this constellation 
abruptly changed. What changed in time was not the question of primacy 
109 Roberts: Revolutionary Time and the Avant-garde, p. 224.
110 Rockhill: Radical history, p. 97. Cf. Arato/Breines: Young Lukács, pp. 224–225; Anderson: Con-
siderations on Western Marxism, p. 7, 9. 
111 It should be recalled that among those who shaped Western Marxism, Lukács was the only 
one to make the unique decision of migrating eastward (Jay: Marxism and Totality, p. 5). For a 
background on the reservations held about Lukács in postwar capitalist societies, cf. Jameson’s 
Reflections in Conclusion (esp. pp. 202–203) and, unavoidably, Perry Anderson’s canonic script 
on Western Marxism. Cf. also another related claim by Jameson: »[…] Only it is easy to see 
why Western thinkers have on the whole preferred the concept of alienation: the latter permits 
the diagnosis of an evidently fallen and degraded reality without demanding of the mind any 
reciprocal attempt to imagine a state in which man no longer is alienated.« (The Case for Georg 
Lukács, p. 164)
112 Lukács: Die Eigenart I, p. 489, cf. p. 743.
113 Largier: Zeit der Möglichkeit, p. 24.
114 Cf. the chapter »On the Nature and Form of the Essay. A Letter to Leo Popper« (Lukács: Soul 
and Form, pp. 16–34; »Ein Brief an Leo Popper«, Die Seele und die Formen, pp. 3–39).
115 Largier: Zeit der Möglichkeit, p. 11.
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of form over content, or vice versa, but the mutual tropical relationship of 
form and content as constituents of the same dialectic form-content unity. 
To repeat, it is not only in Die Eigenart, which is here construed as providing 
synthetic answers to the ethic and aesthetic problems articulated in Soul and 
Form and The Theory of the Novel, that this dialectical unity of content and 
form is apparent; it is already assumed in the early work: 
All writings represent the world in the symbolic terms of a destiny-relationship; every-
where, the problem of destiny determines the problem of form. This unity, this coexistence 
is so strong that neither element ever occurs without the other; here again a separation is 
possible only by way of abstraction.116
However, if in Die Eigenart Lukács explored the modalities of fusion and the 
mutual interaction of contents and forms, in Soul and Form he conducted 
only their analytical secession. The reason why Soul and Form seemingly 
privileged forms over contents was dictated by its focus on »the nature and 
form of the essay« and not, for instance, on the novel in its relation to the 
epic on the one side and the novella on the other. It is due to the artistic 
character of the essay that the duty of a critic is not exploring destinies but 
first and foremost exploring the forms these destinies are coated in: »The 
critic is one who glimpses destiny in forms: whose most profound experi-
ence is the soul-content which forms indirectly and unconsciously conceal 
within themselves.«117 
Besides the interest in the form-oriented métier of a critic, Soul and 
Form unmistakably contains a conceptual draft of what Lukács later theo-
rized as the ›homogeneous medium‹. The moment when the critic discerns 
contents behind forms, i.e., when in the reception process contents emerge 
transmitted through forms, was qualified as a reward for the intent activity 
of the essayist. Two pertinent citations from the »Letter to Leo Popper« 
testify to this unifying mediation of contents through their forms: 
Therefore the separation which I am trying to accomplish here appears, in practice, merely 
as a shift of emphasis: poetry receives its profile and its form from destiny, and form in 
poetry appears always only as destiny [...].118
116 Lukács: Soul and Form, p. 23 (»Jedes Schreiben stellt die Welt im Symbol einer Schicksalsbezie-
hung dar; das Problem des Schicksals bestimmt überall das Problem der Form. Diese Einheit, 
diese Koexistenz ist so stark, daß das eine Element nie ohne das andere auftritt und eine Tren-
nung ist auch hier nur in der Abstraktion möglich.«, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 16).
117 Ibid. (»Der Kritiker ist der, der das Schicksalhafte in den Formen erblickt, dessen stärkstes 
Erlebnis jener Seelengehalt ist, den die Formen indirekt und unbewußt in sich bergen.«, Die 
Seele und die Formen, p. 17)
118 Ibid. (»Die Scheidung also, die ich hier zu vollziehen versuche, scheint praktisch nur ein Un-
terschied der Betonung zu sein: die Dichtung erhält vom Schicksal ihr Profil, ihre Form, die 
Form erscheint dort immer nur als Schicksal […].«, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 16)
201
ZGB 29/2020, 183–208 Perica: Tertium datur
The critic’s moment of destiny, therefore, is that moment at which things become forms – 
the moment when all feelings and experiences on the near or the far side of form receive 
form, are melted down and condensed into form. It is the mystical moment of union 
between the outer and the inner, between soul and form.119 
Although these quotes could never be subsumed under the motto »Das 
determinierende Prinzip ist der Inhalt«, which along with Karl Marx’ saying 
»Sie wissen es nicht, aber sie tun es« serves as a conceptual backbone of Die 
Eigenart des Ästhetischen, they nevertheless already forefeel the substance of 
Lukács’ qualification of content as the determining principle of the aesthetic, 
captured in the following sequel to Die Eigenart’s motto: 
Das determinierende Prinzip ist der Inhalt. Die künstlerische Form entsteht als das 
Mittel, einen gesellschaftlich notwendigen Inhalt so auszudrücken, daß eine – ebenfalls 
ein gesellschaftliches Bedürfnis bildende – konkrete und allgemeine evokative Wirkung 
entstehe.120 
It is against the background of these complementary quotes from Soul 
and Form and Die Eigenart that I acknowledge Butler’s remark on form as 
not merely an expression but already a condition, sign, and possibility of 
content.121 However, her assertion has to be completed by Göcht’s conclu-
sion on the preponderance of the content as displayed in the latter citation. 
Göcht concludes, »[d]ie Form ist immer nur die Form eines bestimmten 
Inhalts und kann logisch nicht von ihm getrennt werden«.122 
Die Eigenart’s unique position in Lukács’ opus as a whole is based on the 
following: Its most pertinent synthetic procedure concerns the dialectical 
relationship of the form-content unity as applying by the same token to 
›souls and forms‹ in poetry and to the overall relationship of art and soci-
ety. Namely, the dialectical form-content unity has multiple valences and 
regards the formal dimensions of literary and artistic genres to the same 
extent as the overall sociological and even ontological relationship of art 
and society. As for the latter dimension, it should be noticed that whereas, 
on the one hand, specifically aesthetic procedures (theorized by Lukács in 
terms of the ›homogenous medium‹) guarantee art’s social distinctiveness, 
on the other hand, it cannot be expected that art assumes responsibility for 
119 Ibid., p. 24 (»Das Schicksalsmoment des Kritikers ist also jenes, wo die Dinge zu Formen 
werden; der Augenblick, wenn alle Gefühle und Erlebnisse, die diesseits und jenseits der Form 
waren, eine Form bekommen, sich zur Form verschmelzen und verdichten. Es ist der mystische 
Augenblick der Vereinigung des Außen und des Innen, der Seele und der Form.«, Die Seele und 
die Formen, pp. 17–18).
120 Lukács: Die Eigenart I, p. 412.
121 Butler: Introduction, p. 2.
122 Göcht: Mimesis – Subjektivität – Realismus, p. 230.
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the political liberation or scientific enlightenment of humankind: This is the 
core of the aforementioned stance against a »metaphysische[] Überspan-
nung der Selbstständigkeit«123 of both art, science, and ethics. In the final 
analysis, the social commitment (sozialer Auftrag) of the aesthetic consists 
of its anthropological and social-philosophical significance that proves to 
be as substantial as the politics proper, which, however, does not imply the 
conclusion that aesthetics may act in place of politics. Besides this homology 
and the simultaneous unexchangeability of politics and aesthetics, the only 
opposition that remains constant throughout all of Lukács’ works is the one 
between the ›whole man‹ and the ›man as a whole‹, the opposition that 
displays a Hegelian dialectics »of the concrete and the abstract«124 and is, as 
such, tackled from the standpoint of both anthropology and psychology as 
well as from the standpoint of social theory. The moment in which Lukács’ 
aesthetics of form-content unity emerges as social philosophy is precisely 
the point where the formal procedures of the ›homogenous medium‹ obtain 
their social significance:
Jedes homogene Medium entsteht aus dem Bedürfnis der Menschen, die für sie objektiv 
gegebene Welt, die zugleich die Welt ihrer Freuden und Leiden, vor allem aber die Welt 
ihrer Tätigkeit, des Ausbaus ihres eigenen Innenlebens und ihrer Wirklichkeitsbewältigung 
ist, von einem bestimmten, wesentlichen Gesichtspunkt aus näher und konkreter, inten-
siver und tiefer, umfassender und detaillierter zu ergreifen, als dies für das Alltagsleben 
möglich ist [...].125 
The quote can be exemplified as follows: The formal, tropical function of 
the form’s relation to its other – the content – is both of an antonymic and 
of a metonymic kind: Although both sides strive for independency, the 
form is always in proximity to, in fact dependent on, the content, while 
the content is in turn in continuous need of a form. Now, if we attest to 
this formal dimension of the form-content unity, the question arises as to 
what is the content of this unity of opposites – and this is not in the sense 
of mundane Inhalt but in terms of its meaning or significance, of Gehalt.126 
Whereas from the standpoint of Soul and Form this question proved to be 
unanswerable, even unintelligible, and whereas in The Theory of the Novel 
its solution already, if only timidly, began to emerge, from Die Eigenart’s 
integrative viewpoint it finally became comprehensible that the specifical-
ly aesthetic Gehalt consists of overcoming particularity and duality and 
thus, as Göcht summarizes it, of »laying ground for the enforcement of 
123 Lukács: Die Eigenart I, p. 489.
124 Jameson: The Case for Georg Lukács, p. 163; cf. Göcht: Mimesis – Subjektivität – Realismus, p. 217.
125 Lukács: Die Eigenart I, p. 630.
126 Cf. ibid., p. 735.
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real this-worldliness«.127 In contrast to The Theory of the Novel, where it 
was merely suggested that the novel could make up for the lost totality, Die 
Eigenart was explicit about the necessity of social commitment of all art, 
not only of the novel. Here, Lukács unambiguously argued that to achieve 
this-worldliness, a reconciliation between the formal and content-related 
side of artwork was mandatory: 
Der Befreiungskampf der Kunst ist also – welthistorisch betrachtet – ein Ringen darum, 
daß der soziale Auftrag der Gesellschaft an sie jene glückliche Mitte zwischen allgemeiner 
Bestimmtheit des Gehalts und freier Beweglichkeit in der Formgebung erhalte, durch die 
erst die Kunst ihre Mission als Selbstbewußtsein der Menschengattung erfüllen kann.128 
On successful eliciting of this felicitous middle ground (»glückliche Mitte«) 
depends not only the quality of artwork but also the quest for the specifically 
aesthetic liberation of humankind. 
The aforementioned emancipatory goal can be achieved not by semi-re-
ligious or moral sermons, also not by pedagogic aims and methods129 but 
by a specifically aesthetic exchange of an ›either-or‹ for the ›as well as‹. 
Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen is abundant with tropes of mediation that 
overcome the binary logic by instituting a third position, which does not 
lie in-between but comes thereafter, as a synthesis of ›one‹ and ›two‹. The 
same applies to the dialectics of autonomy and engagement or of disinter-
estedness and ›Parteilichkeit‹.130 Only by means of a mediation between 
assumed extremes, which is a mediation prepared and developed by art 
exclusively, can the transgression from the quotidian, fragmented ›whole 
man‹ towards the utterly human ›man as a whole‹ take place, can the only 
real duality – the one of the abstract and the concrete – be played out dia-
127 »Grundlagen der Durchsetzung wirklicher Diesseitigkeit« (Göcht: Mimesis – Subjektivität – 
Realismus, p. 212). Cf. Lukács: Die Eigenart I, p. 21; Lukács: Die Eigenart II, p. 815, 822.
128 Lukács: Die Eigenart II, p. 719.
129 Already The Theory of the Novel entertained a critique of plain literary pedagogy. When speaking 
of »the danger of a subjectivity which is not exemplary, which has not become a symbol, and 
which is bound to destroy the epic form«, Lukács mentioned the modem novels of education 
that endow everything »with the fatal, irrelevant and petty character of the merely private; 
it remains a mere aspect, making the absence of a totality the more painfully obvious as it 
constantly claims to create one. The overwhelming majority of modem ›novels of education‹ 
have completely failed to avoid this pitfall.« (Lukács: The Theory of the Novel, p. 137) (»[…] die 
Gefahr einer nicht vorbildlichen, nicht zum Symbol gewordenen Subjektivität, die die epische 
Form sprengen muß. […] Und diese Subjektivität ist unaufhebbarer als die des erzählenden 
Tones: sie gibt allem Dargestellten – selbst wenn die technische Gestaltung aufs vollendetste 
objektiviert ist – den fatalen, belanglosen und kleinlichen Charakter des bloß Privaten; es bleibt 
ein Aspekt, der um so unangenehmer die Totalität vermissen läßt, weil er in jedem Moment mit 
dem Anspruch eine solche zu gestalten, auftritt. Der weitaus größte Teil der modernen Erzie-
hungsromane ist dieser Gefahr rettungslos verfallen.«, Die Theorie des Romans, pp. 148–149)
130 Cf. above, Lukács: Die Eigenart I, p. 616.
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lectically. Now, for the sake of a shift towards the final section of the article, 
let me conclude this section with perhaps the most apposite statement for 
the present problem, as found in the chapter »Homogenes Medium, der 
ganze Mensch und der ›Mensch ganz‹«:131
Das Tertium datur [...] darf aber keine eklektische »Mitte« sein, sondern soll die dialektische 
Einheit von Inhalt und Form (bei Beibehalten der Priorität des Inhalts in der Bestimmung 
der Form als die eines konkreten Inhalts, bei ihrer Anerkennung als unmittelbarer Träger 
der ästhetischen Evokation etc.) in all ihrer Kompliziertheit festhalten und begrifflich 
formulieren. Wenn nun in der analysierenden Darlegung dies zuweilen nur auf Umwe-
gen über – methodologisch – gesonderte Inhalt- und Formkomponenten möglich ist, so 
bedeutet dies nicht die geringste Konzession an die soeben verworfene Eklektik einer hier 
nicht existierenden »Mitte«, denn in jeder getrennten Betrachtung sind diese dialektischen 
Verflochtenheiten immanent mitgedacht.132
5. Tertium datur
The final, hitherto insufficiently explored issue regards the question why 
Lukács arrived, or was able to arrive, at the synthetic solutions proposed 
in his late aesthetics. In conclusion, it should be remembered that Lukács’ 
account of art in modernity complies with other influential contributions 
to this discussion, according to which »works of art, including literary ones, 
point to a practice from which they abstain: the creation of a just life«.133 
Yet he also argues that art is by its own means not only capable but even 
obliged to intervene in the world: »Die Dichtung ist zugleich Entdeckung 
des Lebenskerns und Kritik des Lebens.«; »Die Kunst ist ihrem Wesen nach 
stets eigene Gegenkraft solcher Entartungstendenzen, stets das Vorbild für 
den Aufstand wider deren Einflüsse, das Ideal einer inneren Gesundheit.«134 
Notwithstanding this acknowledgment of art’s critical potential – which 
actually complies with Theodor W. Adorno’s statement – »Even in the most 
sublimated work of art there is a hidden ›it should be otherwise‹.«135 – an 
important disconcerting element in Lukács’ appreciation of art in its relation 
to politics stems from his refusal to adulate accounts of art as the bearer of a 
»promise of total revolutionary praxis«.136 Such accounts, however, seemingly 
131 Ibid., pp. 606–635; cf. also above, note 67.
132 Ibid., p. 613.
133 Bernstein: The Philosophy of the Novel, p. 228.
134 Lukács: Die Eigenart I, p. 740, p. 743. Cf. also the aforementioned imperative of the ›ought‹ or 
›Sollen‹ (ibid., pp. 481–482).
135 Adorno: Commitment, p. 194 (»Noch im sublimiertesten Kunstwerk birgt sich ein ›Es soll anders 
sein‹.«, Engagement, p. 429).
136 Roberts: Revolutionary Time and the Avant-garde, p. 61, emphasis J. R.
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revolutionary, are indeed an asset of liberal art politics that simultaneously 
grant literature its revolutionary ambitions and deny it the power to turn 
these into practice. The claim of art’s »radical passivity«,137 namely that in 
modernity art came to represent a mere placeholder for absent politics, 
»a stand-in for an absent politics«,138 is valid under the condition that 
modernity be equated with liberalism, both as philosophy and as political 
economy. This is precisely what Adorno implicitly confesses to when he 
submits, »[t]his is not a time for political art, but politics has migrated into 
autonomous art, and nowhere more so than where it seems to be politically 
dead«.139 For this reason, Bernstein is right in claiming that to comprehend 
modern art presupposes grasping the kind of politics that is responsible for 
the withdrawal of politics from art. He makes a straightforward claim that 
»[w]ithout a genealogy of liberalism, a genealogy that would give historical 
substance to the fabled suppression of the political […], politics bereaved 
remains an abstraction«.140 The origin of Lukács’ aesthetics after his Marxist 
turn is exactly as summarized by Bernstein: without a genealogy and critique 
of liberalism, which assigns art to its own autonomous and socially detached 
sphere, the social inability of art remains camouflaged and unrecognized. 
Furthermore, Bernstein claims that »the ›we‹ that would sustain political 
judgement and praxis has disappeared from direct view« and has literally 
»gone underground«; as a result, it »appears only through the theoretical 
tracing of the fate that has rendered us strangers to one another«.141 This 
is another pertinent point put forward by Lukács himself, namely that the 
social commitment of art ought to consist first and foremost of a critique 
of the isolation and atomization of individuals who in modernity become 
unable to elevate themselves on levels higher than their own particular, 
private interests.142 Finally, being unable to act in place of a lost or failed 
revolution, or to instigate a new one, art can, however – and this is where the 
›late‹ Lukács joins in with the ›mature‹ one – assist political revolutions or act 
under their auspices. Again, this is granted under the condition that art acts 
as art, that is, by procedures that embody the ›specificity of the aesthetic‹. 
137 Wall: Radical Passivity.
138 Bernstein: The Fate of Art, p. 269.
139 Adorno: Commitment, p. 194 (»An der Zeit sind nicht die politischen Kunstwerke, aber in die 
autonomen ist die Politik eingewandert, und dort am weitesten, wo sie politisch tot sich stellen 
[…].«, Engagement, p. 430).
140 Bernstein: The Fate of Art, p. 268.
141 Ibid., p. 273.
142 For an early note on this atomization, cf. Lukács: Soul and Form, p. 106 (Die Seele und die For-
men, pp. 188–189).
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When Lukács in the 1920s and 1930s classified art and literature as 
supporters and conveyors of organized revolutionary politics, this was a 
practical implementation of his analytical insight that any intervention 
into reality from the exclusive »standpoint of art«143 was doomed to mis-
carriage. Therefore, rather than reading the texts from his ›mature‹ phase 
as programmatic scripts of authoritarian, let alone totalitarian cultural 
politics,144 one should recognize, first, Lukács’ stance on the homologous 
relationship between art and revolution, and second, his insistence that it 
is vital for art and revolution to operate by distinctively different means 
and to follow their system-specific duties. Thus, the emancipation of hu-
mankind is accomplished by a two-level operation: by political (collective) 
revolution and simultaneously by the aesthetic creation of the ›man as a 
whole‹. To confuse one with the other would mean failing both revolution 
and art. Obviously, although it is agreed that aesthetics was often »the form 
in which he talked politics«,145 Lukács’ understanding of the relationship 
between art and politics was of a conspicuously different tropical character 
than the related reflections that similarly drew on art’s modern right to its 
own autonomy and specificity. The essential difference between Lukács’ 
socialist aesthetics and the theoretizations of »art under capitalism«146 
consists of their diverging relationship towards politics: For Lukács, aes-
thetics serves not as a placeholder for politics but as its companion; it does 
not gesture towards a just world by means of a rhetorical stance of pars 
pro toto but acknowledges and even assists politics in its struggle for the 
liberation of humankind. Yet what applies to the individual subject applies 
to the same extent to the aesthetic: »on no account must [it] ever become 
a mere instrument«.147
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